NDO 22/07

Dear Mr Trkulja,

Mr Titley would like me to thank you on his behalf for bringing the issue of refugee repatriation in Croatia to his attention. As a member of the Delegation to the EU-Croatia Joint Parliamentary Committee Mr Titley is always concerned to hear such distressing news. In response Mr Titley asked a Written Question to the Commission on your behalf to see what the Commission whether or not the Commission knew of the problem and what it would do to rectify the situation. You can see Mr Titley's Written Question at the webpage:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sidesSearch/search.do?type=QP&language=EN&term=6&author=1311#

Recently we received the following answer from the Commission which can also be seen at the website listed above:

'E-2575/07EN

Answer given by Mr Rehn

on behalf of the Commission

(15.6.2007)



The stated policy of the Croatian Government is to facilitate the repatriation of those refugees wishing to return to Croatia. This policy is being supported by a number of measures, notably in the field of housing where there are three main areas of intervention: a) restitution of occupied properties; b) reconstruction of damaged properties; and c) Housing Care programmes for former occupancy and tenancy rights holders wishing to return to Croatia. The latest figures available to the Commission show that there are around 88,000 registered refugees from Croatia residing in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. It would appear that the majority of these refugees do not plan to return to Croatia.
Notwithstanding the existence of some outstanding difficulties, there has been generally good progress as regards property restitution and reconstruction in recent years. However, progress with implementation of Housing Care for former occupancy and tenancy rights holders has been particularly poor, especially outside Areas of Special State Concern. Currently around 9,000 applications for Housing Care remain to be resolved, affecting perhaps 20,000 possible returns. Sustainability of return is also hampered by economic difficulties faced in the main areas of return, as well as enduring hostility in some localities and difficulties with access to certain rights, such as recognition of working years in the former occupied areas of Croatia necessary for pensions entitlements.
It is clear that despite progress in recent years, more needs to be done by Croatia to settle outstanding refugee issues. The EU has laid down a number of short-term priorities concerning refugee return in the Accession Partnership for Croatia approved in spring 2006. The Commission for its part will continue to raise these matters with the Croatian authorities on a regular basis within the appropriate fora as well as to support efforts aimed at tackling the remaining shortcomings.'

Mr Titley hopes that this helps you in your work and that you will not hesitate to contact us in the future should you feel the need to do so.

Yours Sincerely,

George Sinnott

George Sinnott
Office of Gary Titley MEP
Leader, European Parliamentary Labour Party

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 25, 2004

The Republic of Croatia is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with an independent presidency. The President, Stjepan Mesic (formerly of the Croatian People's Party, but now independent), serves as head of state and commander of the armed forces, and nominates the Prime Minister who leads the Government. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) determined that the November 23 parliamentary elections generally met international standards; however, some issues of concern remained. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary continued to suffer from political influence at the local level.


The Ministry of Interior (MUP) oversees the civilian national police, and the Ministry of Defense oversees the military and military police. The national police has primary responsibility for internal security; but, in times of disorder, the Government and President may call upon the army to provide security. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces. Some members of the security forces committed isolated human rights abuses.


The Government worked towards creating a market-based economy that was primarily industrial. The population of the country was approximately 4,437,000 and real gross domestic product increased by 4.6 percent. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), the average unemployment rate for the first 6 months of the year was 14.1 percent.


The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The Government continued to arrest, charge, and adjudicate persons for war crimes committed during the 1991-95 conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia; the State Prosecutor initiated investigations into several allegations involving Croatian forces and took steps to depoliticize cases against ethnic Serbs. Ethnic Serbs remained incarcerated after being convicted in nontransparent politicized trials in past years. The courts were subject to political influence and suffered from bureaucratic inefficiency, insufficient funding, and a severe backlog of cases. The Government made efforts to address changing of testimony by witnesses sometimes due to intimidation, an often-hostile local public, inadequate training of judges, prosecutors, and police, and shortcomings in the Criminal Procedure Code which had called into question the criminal justice systems ability to conduct fair and transparent war crimes trials; however, the slow pace of reform in the courts and prosecutor's offices resulted in few improvements in the functioning of the judiciary. Courts decreased the practice of convicting persons in mass and in absentia trials. At times, the Government infringed on privacy rights; restitution of occupied property to refugees (mostly ethnic Serb) returning to the country remained slow and problematic.


The Government did not interfere in the editorial decisions of the print media; however, electronic media was susceptible to political pressure. Governmental interference in the formation and operation of associations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was limited; however, the creation and internal governance of foundations remained susceptible to government influence. Restitution of nationalized property remained a significant unresolved problem for religious communities. Lack of progress on private property restitution and resolution of the right to previously socially-owned property, along with severe economic difficulties in the war-affected areas, continued to impede returns of refugees. There were concerns over the level of cooperation with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Questions remained regarding the Government's ability to apprehend and deliver prominent Croatians indicted for war crimes.


Violence and discrimination against women persisted. There were some incidents of violence and harassment of religious minorities. Occasional violence toward ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, continued; some faced serious discrimination. While some progress was made, ethnic tensions in the war-affected areas remained high, and abuses, including ethnically motivated harassment and assaults, continued to occur. Trafficking in women was a problem.



RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:


a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the Government or its agents.


Domestic courts continued to adjudicate cases arising from the 1991-95 conflict in Croatia and Bosnia (see Section 1.e.).


Two persons were killed, one in Lika-Senj and one in Sibenik, in landmine incidents during the year.


b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.


Government figures through June showed that 1,235 ethnic Croats and 607 ethnic Serbs remained missing in unresolved cases from the 1991-95 military conflict. The Government's Office of Missing Persons had information on 500 sites where missing Croatian Serbs might be located. Of the 3,924 victims that have been exhumed from mass and individual graves since the war 3,054 have been positively identified.


During the year, the bodies of 55 victims missing from the 1991-95 war were exhumed from mass and individual graves; the Government explained the relatively low number of exhumations by the fact that frequently partial remains were unearthed at one site only to discover that the actual bodies were moved to another yet undiscovered site. With the ICTY and international experts serving primarily as monitors, the Government handled all exhumations and identifications itself.


The International Commission on Missing Persons worked in the country on recovery, identification of remains, and assisting the families of missing persons. The Government Office for Missing initiated cooperation with counterpart agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia and Montenegro, in collaboration with the International Red Cross and local Red Cross offices, for the purpose of data collection and information sharing designed to establish more precise figures on the missing.


c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment


The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were no reports that government officials employed them.

NGOs and individuals reported sporadically about police abuse of or discriminatory treatment demonstrated toward minorities in and outside of the Danube Region. Senior police officials acknowledged poor police performance as an issue to be addressed when reviewing the police role during eviction proceedings and court-ordered actions (see Section 5).

Prison conditions generally met international standards, and the Government permitted visits by independent human rights observers. Men and women were held separately, juveniles were held separately from adults, and pretrial detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile


The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government did not always observe these prohibitions in practice.

The 2000 Law on Police governs the structure and organization of police work. This law effectively de-militarized police structures which had remained from the country's war experiences following the break up of the former Yugoslavia. Following the adoption of this law, the Government completed a significant downsizing of the police force. The Government also separated intelligence services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and created an independent oversight board to monitor the performance of the services.

Widespread ethnic tension between ethnic Serb and Croat police officers existed, particularly in the Danubian region, where some Croat officers were laid off in 2001 to maintain proportionality in the ethnic mix of the police force as required by the 1995 Erdut Agreement. The Government appeared to fulfill its obligation under the Agreement to maintain proportionality in the numbers of ethnic Serb and Croat police officers in Eastern Slavonia; however, minority representation in the police outside Eastern Slavonia remained negligible, and the Government had not fully implemented provisions in Constitutional Law on National Minorities that require the hiring of minorities. In October, the Government hired 278 new police recruits. Of these, 209 were male and 69 were female, 22 were minorities, including 16 ethnic Serbs.

International observers and human rights organizations generally praised the police for their integrity; however, corruption was believed to be a problem, particularly among border police and customs officers. The Ministry of Internal Affairs began to update and codify rules of ethical police conduct and improve the capabilities of the police internal control section. Reforms were needed in the Ministry of Finance to which the Customs Service reports, to improve ethical standards and internal control capabilities. NGOs working on anti-corruption programs reported that public officials, even when exposed through media coverage, were rarely investigated or prosecuted for corrupt practices.

Problems in the police force included poor investigative techniques, insensitivity to ethnic issues, indecisive middle management, and pressure from hard-line local politicians. These factors impeded development of local police capability. In April, the Ministry of Internal Affairs launched a comprehensive program of police reforms, in part, to extend community policing pilot programs to all regions of the country; initial assessments by the international community were positive, although considerable work remained. In October, the Police Academy accepted its first training class under a completely redesigned basic police school developed with international assistance. During the year, the Police Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs launched the first programs in a regular series to provide in-service training for all active police officers; the goal of these programs was to ensure that every individual police officer received some form of advanced or refresher training at least once a year.

Police normally obtain arrest warrants by presenting evidence of probable cause to an investigative magistrate; however, it was not uncommon for police to make arrests without a warrant if they believed a suspect might flee, destroy evidence, or commit other crimes. The police then have 24 hours to justify the arrest to a magistrate.

Detainees must be given access to an attorney of their choice within 24 hours of their arrest; if they have none and are charged with a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years' imprisonment, the magistrate appoints counsel. Detainees were also allowed visits by family members. The magistrate must, within 48 hours of the arrest, decide whether to extend the detention for further investigation. Investigative detention generally lasts up to 30 days, but the trial court may extend the period in exceptional cases (for a total of not more than 6 months, or 12 months in serious corruption/organized crime cases). Detainees may be released on their own recognizance pending further proceedings; however, most criminal suspects were held in custody pending trial. Detention was perceived to be necessary where the accused was considered a public danger, may influence witnesses, or a flight risk. There were several cases of suspects held in pretrial detention for several months on weak evidence.

The option of posting bail after an indictment is available but was not commonly exercised.

The inability of trial judges to issue written verdicts delayed the appeals process and was the major cause of extended detention. For example, in the Norac case (see Section 1.e.), the county court issued a verdict in March; however, because no written verdict had been issued, the appeal process had not begun by year's end.

Arrests of ethnic Serbs for war crimes continued but decreased throughout the year. In some cases of arrest on war crimes charges, the subject was released a few days after charges were dropped; however, in other cases, persons were detained for long periods. In September, although an initial investigation produced no evidence of his direct involvement, Ilija Vorkapic, a resident of Lovas, was arrested and detained for 2 weeks for the attack and occupation of Lovas in 1991.

Over the last few years, several ethnic Serb defendants convicted in absentia or at nontransparent trials continued to be held in detention for extended periods while their appeals progressed slowly through the overburdened judicial system (see Section 1.e.).

The Constitution prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government did not employ it.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial


The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary continued to suffer from political influence, a backlog of nearly 1.4 million cases, and funding and training shortfalls.

A significant part of the backlog was attributable to outdated procedural codes and court rules; inexperienced judges and staff; and, primarily in civil cases, to verdicts that had not been executed. Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial and a variety of due process rights in the courts, at times, citizens were denied these rights. Excessive delays remained a problem, as evidenced by an increasing number of decisions by the Constitutional Court to award damages to persons whose trial had continued for numerous years without a decision. Additionally, the Government at times ignored Constitutional Court decisions, particularly with regard to the privatization of property.

The judicial system consists of municipal and county courts, commercial and misdemeanor courts, an administrative court, and the Supreme Court as the highest court. The independent Constitutional Court determines the constitutionality of laws, governmental acts, and elections. Justices of the Constitutional Court are elected for 8-year terms by Parliament, while all other judges are appointed for life. A parallel commercial court system adjudicates commercial and contractual disputes. The State Judicial Council (which consists of 11 members, including 7 judges, who serve 8-year terms), which is independent of both the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice, is charged with the appointment and discipline, including removal, of judges. The Chief State Prosecutor is appointed by Parliament and he then appoints the Chief State Attorneys at the county and municipal level; Deputy Prosecutors were appointed and disciplined by the High Prosecutorial Council. The process of re-appointing court presidents was completed by year's end.

Judges are constitutionally prohibited from being members of political parties. Over the past 3 years, the judiciary was subject to far less political influence than previously, although there continued to be reports of political influence at the local level.

Judges appointed under the government of former President Franjo Tudjman, who at times made decisions in a nontransparent manner seemingly at odds with the evidence or the law, were a problem. For example, in September, Split County Court judge Slavko Lozina, sentenced a former special police commander to 4 years and 11 months for the 1996 murder of a young Croatian of Serbian ethnicity. The Judge failed to give a formal explanation of what all observers considered a lenient sentence. Media reports alleged that the sentence was structured in a way so that the defendant could avoid custody during the appeal process. No disciplinary action was taken against the Judge in the case, although the Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court both launched inquires into his behavior during the trial.

The inexperience of newly appointed judges and areas without permanent judges, particularly in the war-affected regions, continued to be problems. In March, the Ministry of Justice opened a new Center for the Professional Development of Judges and Other Justice Officials. In July, the Government formally adopted an implementation plan for judicial reform. The plan addressed technical issues and was designed to improve the quality of judicial decision-making and reduce court processing times, but left many implementation issues unaddressed; implementation of these judicial reforms was not completed by year's end.

In an election year, all election commissions from the national to the local level, are constituted on an ad hoc basis and staffed primarily by professional judges. The chair of 1 district commission, of which there were 10 total, reported that the November parliamentary election consumed 1 month for more than 30 judges. The OSCE recommended that a permanent electoral commission be established, at least in part to free judges from the additional task of conducting elections.

Domestic courts continued to adjudicate cases arising from the 1991-95 war. Despite the increased number of open war crime cases involving Croatian forces, questions remained about the criminal justice system's ability to conduct fair and transparent trials in these complex and emotionally charged cases. Observers blamed inadequate training, shortcomings in the legal code, chronic witness intimidation, and an often-hostile local public as hampering the war crimes process.

International observers continued to express concern about the justice system's ability to treat defendants equally without regard to ethnic identity. The OSCE reported that the outcomes of war crimes prosecutions appeared to be largely determined by the ethnic identity of both the defendant and the victim. For example, in 2002, there was a significantly different rate of conviction and acquittal depending on the ethnic identity of the defendant; 82 percent of all ethnic Serbs were found guilty, whereas only 18 percent of Croats were found guilty. Similar rates were found for the first part of the year. At all stages of proceedings, except for acquittals, ethnic Serbs constituted the large majority of defendants. In absentia proceedings, despite some efforts to curtail the practice, were applied almost exclusively to ethnic Serb defendants. The conclusion of the OSCE was that war crimes prosecutions continued to be motivated more by ethnic considerations than by the impartial administration of justice.

In October, the Parliament passed the Law on Application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Prosecution of Criminal Acts Against International Military and Humanitarian Law. This new war crimes law allows the Chief State Prosecutor, with the approval of the President of the Supreme Court, to obtain a change of venue for any war crimes case to one of four country-level courts, requires trials to be conducted before a three-judge panel of experienced judges who are appointed to 4 year terms, and creates the office of a special prosecutor, under the Chief State Prosecutor, to prosecute war crimes.

During the year, the domestic prosecution of war crimes cases continued, primarily against ethnic Serbs, but increasingly against ethnic Croats. For example, during the year, the Chief State Prosecutor requested that investigations be opened into the killings of ethnic Serbs in Sisak, Osijek, and Pozega that took place over 10 years ago; however, due to problems with witness intimidation, many of the investigations have not led to indictments.

In August, the Gospic County Court convicted Svetozar Karan, a former member of the Serbian military police for the severe beating of prisoners of war in Korenica and Frkasic between 1991 and 1995. The written verdict contained inflammatory and derogatory remarks about ethnic Serbs, such as "the defendant and his (Serb) predecessors have been sitting on Croatia's back for the past 80 years," that called into question the court's ability to conduct a fair trial.

In February, the County Prosecutor in Split appealed the acquittal to the Supreme Court in the high-profile Lora war crimes case (eight Croatian soldiers were accused of torturing ethnic Serb prisoners) on grounds of wrongly and incompletely established facts and failure to admit crucial evidence. The appeal remained pending before the Supreme Court at year's end.

In March, the war crimes trial against five persons held at the County Court in Rijeka ended with convictions of Tihomir Oreskovic, former Croatian Army General Mirko Norac, and Stjepan Grandic, who were sentenced, respectively, to 15, 12 and 10 years in prison. This marked the first time that senior Croatian military officials have been convicted in a Croatian court for war crimes and, in contrast to the "Lora" trial, monitors considered the so-called Gospic trial fair and well conducted. The three defendants were found guilty of abduction and execution of at least 50 Serb and Croat civilians in the area of Gospic in 1991. Ivica Rozic was acquitted for lack of evidence, and charges were dropped against the fifth defendant, Milan Canic.

In June, trial proceedings began in the so-called Paulin Dvor case in Osijek County Court against Nikola Ivankovic and Enes Viteskic, 2 lower-ranking army officers suspected of participation in the December 1991 killing of 19 ethnic Serb civilians. The victims were killed in Paulin Dvor in Eastern Slavonia and buried at a military warehouse, then in 1997 their remains were secretly transferred across Croatia to a mass grave near Gospic, where they were discovered by the ICTY and Government investigators. The case gained added prominence when testimony by a former Osijek-Baranja county prefect implicated the wartime defense leader of Osijek and current Member of Parliament (M.P.) for the area, Branimir Glavas, in a series of murders of ethnic Serbs and Croatian Army soldiers in Osijek between 1991-95. Revelations at trial prompted a local NGO to forward information on wartime criminal activities in Osijek to the prosecution (see Section 4).

The retrial of Mihajlo Hrastov, a former Croatian member of the Karlovac Police Special Forces, for the murder of 13 unarmed Yugoslav National Army prisoners of war near Karlovac in 1991, ended at the Karlovac County Court in an acquittal. The prosecution appealed the case to the Supreme Court in late 2002 but the Court had taken no action by year's end.

The appeal of the acquittal of four retired Croatian soldiers, charged with killing two elderly Serb civilians near Sibenik in 1995, remained pending at year's end.

The appeal of Bosnian Fikret Abdic's 20-year prison sentence for the deaths of 121 civilian detainees and 3 military prisoners between 1993 and 1995 remained pending at year's end.

In 2001, the Constitutional Court ordered a retrial in the case of former Croatian policeman Antun Gudelj, who was convicted and then improperly amnestied in 1997 for the 1991 murder of Osijek police chief Josip Reihl-Kir. At year's end, bilateral legal discussions on the arrest and extradition from Australia continued.

Activities that should have qualified for amnesty under the 1996 Law on General Amnesty were classified mistakenly and prosecuted as common crimes or war crimes, although this practice declined and was under review by the Public Prosecutor.

Some courts continued the practice of convicting persons in mass and in absentia trials; however, in July 2002, the chief State Prosecutor initiated a case-by-case review of war crimes cases and sought to limit the use of in absentia proceedings. While 293 cases were dropped as a result of this review by the end of August, local prosecutors and courts continued to conduct in absentia proceedings, which were used almost exclusively against ethnic Serb defendants. In cases monitored by the OSCE during the year, 85 percent of all ethnic Serbs convicted for war crimes were convicted in absentia proceedings. No ethnic Croat has been a part of a group in absentia proceeding, nor has any ethnic Croat been convicted in such a proceeding. The practice of in absentia proceedings placed an added burden on the courts, since defendants convicted in absentia regularly made use of their guaranteed right for a re-trial.

In February, an in absentia trial held at the Zadar County Court, 2 Serbs were sentenced to 9 and 10 years in prison respectively for the 1991 shooting of an ethnic Serb in Perusic, whom they suspected of collaborating with Croatian authorities. In August, the Osijek County Court convicted eight Serbs in absentia for crimes against civilians in the village of Luc in Eastern Slavonia in 1990. In September, the Vukovar County Court began trial proceedings against 18 former members of a Serb paramilitary unit who were charged with genocide and war crimes in the 1991 attack and subsequent occupation of the town of Lovas in Eastern Slavonia. Only one of the accused was present during the trial.

At year's end, approximately 21 individuals remained incarcerated on war crimes or related charges based on politicized or nontransparent trials held under the previous regime. For those who had exhausted their appeal procedures, there was no mechanism to review their cases other than seeking pardons. There were no other reports of political prisoners.

In cases regarding property claims, the laws implicitly favor ethnic Croats over ethnic Serbs. Despite a 1998 Constitutional Court ruling that declared several elements of the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified Property unconstitutional, many thousands of ethnic Serb property owners, who fled homes that were later occupied by ethnic Croats, remained unable to access their property.

The Government completed a review in 2001 of housing units that were distributed for temporary occupancy by the previous regime; the data provided was intended to facilitate eventual returns and property restitution. However, at year's end, 3,509 of the 19,271 housing units remained occupied. Many of the occupants of these units were subject to immediate eviction; however, in practice, evictions have not occurred. Backlogs in the judicial system were a further impediment to timely resolution of housing disputes.

During the year, the Government did not implement its plan to facilitate the return of largely ethnic Serb refugees by making available state housing to those who previously enjoyed occupancy and tenancy rights outside war-affected areas in the former Socialist Republic of Croatia.

In 2000, the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the Law on the Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees that prohibited evictions unless alternative accommodation is provided for the evictee. This practice reinforced the precedence of temporary occupants over that of property owners. The July 2002 amendments to the Laws on Areas of Special State Concern (LASSC) introduced measures designed to facilitate property repossession, but the law continues to subordinate the rights of private property owners to those of temporary users. The Government has not evicted occupiers of private property, even in the case of illegal or double occupants; physical repossession of a property by its rightful owner occurred, almost exclusively, only when the occupier decided that he or she no longer needed the property.

The State Attorney is responsible for conducting the eviction process against those who are illegally occupying houses; however, out of 718 existing cases of illegal/double occupancy, less than half have been referred to the State Prosecutor's office, and most repossessions took place only through extra judicial settlements. Despite orders from the national Government, prosecutors often did not initiate lawsuits against individuals who refused to vacate occupied premises.

The amended LASSC has not accelerated the process of legally resolving property restitution cases; it provides no guarantee to claimants that they can physically repossess their property, and there were no mechanisms to implement the new legal provisions. Additionally, the LASSC subordinates the rights of private property owners to those of temporary occupants by making property repossession conditional on provision of alternative accommodation for the temporary occupant and thus, violates the right to ownership as provided for in the Constitution.

The July 2002 amendments to the LASSC stipulated a timeframe for recipients of alternative housing assistance to complete construction or reconstruction and to vacate occupied properties. Under the amendments, illegal or double occupants were given up to 60 days after receipt of an administrative order to vacate or face eviction; however, in practice, the Government has not effectively enforced the law, and most cases remain self-solved.

The LASSC obligated the Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees to make administrative decisions on repossession. The amended law further obligates the Government to pay compensation to the legitimate owners if it fails to physically return their properties by December 31; however, only 657 owners out of 3,819 eligible owners received a compensation payment by year's end.

During the year, the Government significantly accelerated processing of claims by ethnic Serbs for reconstruction assistance.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence


The Constitution prohibits such actions, and the Government generally respected these prohibitions in practice.

Police were often unwilling to intervene in housing disputes, which involved attack against property, looting, and arson, and were a frequent occurrence in war-affected areas (see Section 5). There were frequent allegations that the police did not always remain impartial and uphold the law when it came to housing disputes between ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press


The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press, and the Government generally respected these rights in practice. The constitutional provisions specifically include freedom of the press and other media, speech and public expression, and the free establishment of institutions of public communication.

The Government did not interfere in the editorial decisions of the print media; however, electronic media was susceptible to political pressure since most outlets were at least partially owned by local government.

In October, Parliament passed a new Media Law that creates preconditions for freedom of the media and journalism. Among the most important of these are regulations on the transparency of ownership, the operational activities of the media, and on measures to protect journalists from in-house and external pressures. Under the law, media outlets must make their ownership structure public, and publishers must send annual business reports to the Ministry of Culture. The new law also prevents monopolies by limiting media ownership to 40 percent of any given market.

The privately owned Tisak distributed approximately 75 percent of the print media. Foreign newspapers and journals were available in urban areas throughout the country; however, due to their high cost, they remained largely inaccessible to many persons.

In February, a new law on Croatian Radio and Television (HRT) was passed, that should provide for HRT's financial stability, political independence, and the presentation of objective information to the public. According to the OSCE, with the exception of provisions relating to the appointment of the HRT Broadcasting Council, the law represents a considerable improvement over the one previously in force. After a long delay, on October 17 Parliament approved 11 members of the HRT Broadcasting Council; the Council held its first meeting on November 14.

In April, the Croatian Helsinki Committee (HHO) reported that Croatian Television (HTV) was no longer under government influence, but its programming remained biased in its objectivity and quality of coverage. According to HHO, HTV paid insufficient attention to important post-war issues such as refugee return, war crimes, minority issues, and human rights.

In September, the Council for Radio and Television privatized HRT's third national television channel in an open and transparent process. HRT was no longer the sole beneficiary of revenue from government taxes on television users. The new Electronic Media Law allocated 3 percent of HRT's revenue from government taxes to local, private radio and television stations. In the past, being the sole recipient of government funding created advantages for HRT over independent radio and television stations.

Although HINA became a public institution in 2001, by year's end the Government still provided most of HINA's funding and a truly independent nationwide television news and entertainment station did not exist.

Over 60 percent of the population continued to rely on government-run HRT's evening Dnevnik program for television news. While privately owned Nova TV reached more than 75 percent of the population during the year, it was primarily an entertainment station with limited news programming. A network of independent local television stations produced a competing nightly news program Vijesti that reached 65 percent of the country's territory.

In early March, a bomb explosion destroyed a car that belonged to the Europa Press Holding publishing company while it was parked in front of the house of the founder and co-owner Ninoslav Pavic. There were no arrests in the case by year's end. In December, Ivan Caleta, one of the co-owners of Nova TV, was shot and injured in Zagreb. The OSCE issued a statement that "such threats...have a chilling effect on the media."

A 2001 Penal Code amendment decriminalized the offense of libel, resulting in a lower filing rate of such cases; however, an estimated 1,200 libel cases from previous years remained unresolved due to the slow and inefficient judicial system. In recent years, there have been no reports of biased verdicts in libel cases. Sections of the Penal Code that authorize prosecution of journalists who publish "state secrets" remained in force; however, there were no reports of these laws being used during the year.

The Government did not restrict access to the Internet or academic freedom.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association


The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in practice.

The law permits assembly for registered demonstrations at approved locations; while the process for approving or denying the registration of an assembly is not transparent, there were no reports that it was used discriminatorily. During the year, there were several peaceful demonstrations and marches throughout the country organized by labor groups, farmers, and war veterans' groups opposed to government policies (see Section 6.b.).

The Constitution provides for the right of association, and the Government generally respected this right in practice.

Although the Law on Associations provides for these rights, the Law on Funds and Foundations, enacted in 1995, grants discretionary power to the Ministry of Justice over the establishment and internal governance of foundations. While the law was applied equally to all, the law itself is restrictive and controlling. According to the Ministry, registration of a foundation, takes up to 6 months provided that all submitted documents were in order. Only approximately 70 foundations have been registered (compared with 20,000 registered associations under the Law on Associations).

c. Freedom of Religion


The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. No formal restrictions were imposed on religious groups, and all religious communities were free to conduct public services and to open and run social and charitable institutions.

There is no official state religion; however, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed a historic relationship with the State that was not shared by other religious groups. Other religious groups also have agreements with the State which grant benefits similar to those enjoyed by the Catholic Church. State financing of salaries of religious workers; provision of spiritual counseling in state institutions such as the army, police, and prisons; and the recognition of religious marriages were among the main points of the agreements. The Government adopted a similar agreement with the Jewish community; however, its signing fell through over the key issue of return of nationalized property.

In January, the Government approved a regulation on the registration of religious communities, which required all religious communities to submit registration applications within 6 months in order to receive status as a legal person. Approximately 27 religious communities were registered during the year. In October, agreements were signed with the Croatian Old Catholic Church, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Croatia.

The Government required that religious training be provided in schools, although attendance was optional. Given that 85 percent of the population was Roman Catholic, the Catholic catechism was the one predominantly offered. Under the 2002 Law on Religious Communities, Catholic religious education was introduced in kindergartens across the country; this prompted criticism from representatives of some other religious communities, particularly the Orthodox Church, and political parties. The Islamic community began training staff for the purpose of conducting religious education in kindergartens in 2004. As stipulated in all agreements signed with religious communities, schools that met the necessary quota of seven students of a minority faith per class offered separate religion classes for the students. In cases where there were not sufficient numbers of students of a minority faith to warrant separate classes, students could exercise the option to receive religious instruction through their religious community.

Restitution of nationalized property remained a problem for most major religious communities. Restitution to the Catholic Church is regulated by a 1998 concordat with the Vatican and the December 2002 agreements with the Islamic community and Serbian Orthodox Church established joint commissions with the Government to resolve property, legal, educational, and cultural issues. The joint commissions met during the year, and religious communities reported that there were frequent and constructive discussions with the Government; however, the joint commissions lack authority to return property, which was the overarching issue of concern to religious communities. The Serbian Orthodox Church--the second largest claimant of property after the Catholic Church--has repossessed a significant amount of business property in Zagreb, as well as some property in Rijeka and Osijek; however, several buildings in Zagreb, Karlovac, and other towns had not been returned, nor had properties that belonged to monasteries, including forests and arable land. Similarly, the Jewish community has had only partial success in recovering its properties; long standing negotiations with the Government's Office for Property Repossession on three buildings in Zagreb, Ravna Gora, and Crikvenica were unsuccessful, and no property was returned during the year. At year's end, according to the Catholic Church, the Government made a proposal, but never initiated formal negotiations, to give the Catholic Church a 25 percent interest in the country's major insurance company, Croatia Osiguranje, as compensation for a part of its nationalized property.

The Islamic community reported delays with obtaining permits to build an Islamic Center on land owned by the community in the coastal city of Rijeka. In March, approximately 5,000 citizens signed a petition opposing construction in their neighborhood, but the city authorities accepted the plan; however, actual construction had not begun by year's end.

In January, the driver for the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church was verbally abused in front of the main church in Zagreb. In September, an incident occurred involving verbal abuse against the Metropolitan and another member of the Serbian Orthodox clergy.

In March and again in May, fascist graffiti appeared on the church door, and obituaries were regularly torn off the billboard by the church entrance. Sometime between March and April, the Serbian Orthodox Church of St. Archangel Michael and Gabriel in Kostajnica was broken into. Windows were smashed and religious items, including four icons, were burned or badly damaged. In April, windows were broken at the Serbian Orthodox Church in Plaski, and similar incidents were reported in Ogulin in August and September. No arrests were made in any of the cases. According to the OSCE and other reporting, Serbian Orthodox churches and property in war-affected areas were attacked during the year. In April, tombstones in a cemetery in Vukovar were damaged--marking the eighth such incident at the cemetery. Serbian Orthodox Church leaders reported that in Knin the Church of St. Pokrov was frequently desecrated with fascist Ustasha symbols. Serbian Orthodox clergy reported good cooperation with the police, who promptly reacted to reported incidents, but complained about a lack of information on the results of investigations.

In June, insulting graffiti appeared on the walls and minaret of the Zagreb mosque. Police investigated, but no arrests were made.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2003 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation


The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. All persons must register their residence with the local authorities and, under exceptional circumstances, the Government legally may restrict the right to enter or leave the country if necessary to protect the "legal order, health, rights, or freedoms of others." Freedom of movement continued to be constrained for returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly in Eastern Slavonia, where those who lost tenancy rights experienced difficulties in regularizing their status because they had no permanent residence (domicile), which is a precondition for acquisition of a civilian ID.

International observers remained concerned that arrests of ethnic Serbs for war crimes, often based on weak evidence, dissuaded some refugees from returning.

The Government's procedures to verify and document the citizenship of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs who fled the country after the military operations in 1995 improved during the year; however, there were regular reports of obstruction by some local officials. Many cases existed in which Serb returnees experienced difficulties in obtaining identity cards and other forms of documentation that would allow them to verify their citizenship status. The municipal government in Gracac obstructed returns to Donji Srb and other municipalities under its jurisdiction while at the same time providing immediate assistance to ethnic Croat settlers from BiH.

During the year, the MUP conducted a review of 441 permanent residency documents of Croatian Serb returnees who were habitual residents of Croatia prior to 1991. Many were able to regularize their status, obtain identity documents, and apply for citizenship through naturalization; however, international monitors reported that the MUP followed different procedures and varied its interpretation of its own internal guidelines from case to case.

The new Law on Foreigners was scheduled to enter into force on January 1, 2004. The Law's transitional provisions are designed to enable former habitual residents to return and regularize their status. The law states that if they return within 12 months, they would be reinstated into their pre-war status of former habitual residents without any further requirements, such as meeting housing and financial criteria, and could subsequently apply for citizenship.

A significant number of IDPs remained in the country, although not all were under the Government's direct care (approximately 1,715 ethnic Serb IDPs in the Croatian Danube Region did not hold official IDP status). In December, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were 12,566 IDPS in the country (75 percent of whom were ethnic Croats originating from the Danube region) and 4,195 refugees (mostly from BiH). These numbers did not fully reflect an additional 140,000 former refugees (nearly all ethnic Croats from BiH) who have become citizens and residents of Croatia.

President Mesic and the Prime Minister continued to make public statements encouraging the return and reintegration of all Croatian citizens to their prewar homes. However, despite an ongoing government program to reconstruct thousands of homes damaged in the 1991-95 war, government officials, NGOs, and international observers assessed that the returns process was nearing its completion with significant changes in the ethnic composition of most communities. The return of ethnic Croats to their prewar domiciles was virtually complete; however, the Serbian minority still faced significant obstacles to return. While ethnic tensions continued in the Danube region and parts of Dalmatia, the overall security situation was stable (see Section 5). The largest disincentive to returns in the Danube region was the poor state of the regional economy, the absence of a concrete solution that provides housing to former tenancy rights holders, and the very slow pace of repossession of private property.